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I Introduction
According to the famous statement of Heinrich Heine, Corpus iuris is the ‘Bible of egoism’.
Although Heine’s conclusion is somewhat excessive, it is out of question that private autonomy
had great importance in Roman law, and not only in private law1 in which autonomy had
a  fundamental importance (especially in the law of contracts, which primarily contains
‘dispositive’ rules, from which the parties may differ by mutual consent, and in the law of
succession, considering the principle of testamentary freedom)2, but in public law3 as well.
Iván Siklósi*
Private Autonomy and Its Restrictions 
in Roman Law: An Overview Regarding 
the Law of Contracts and Succession
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* Iván Siklósi (PhD) is assistant professor at Eötvös Loránd University, Faculty of Law, Department of Roman Law
and Comparative Legal History (e-mail: ivan.siklosi@ajk.elte.hu).
1 The division of law into ‘private’ and ‘public’ law branches itself (a distinction that, as is well-known, has no
fundamental importance in the legal thinking of common law jurisdictions) was based on the dichotomy of
utilitas privata (private interest) and utilitas publica (public interest); cf. Ulp. D. 1, 1, 1, 2. On the problem of the
distinction between private and public law, see e.g. Gábor Hamza, ‘Reflections on the Classification (divisio) into
‘Branches’ of Modern Legal Systems and Roman Law Traditions’ in Cosimo Cascione and others (eds), Fides
Humanitas Ius. Studii in onore di Luigi Labruna, vol 4 (Editoriale Scientifica 2007, Napoli, 2449–2476) 2449ff.
2 As for the law of things, we can refer, inter alia, to Hadrian’s and Justinian’s regime on treasure trove (cf. Vita Hadr. 18,
6 and Inst. 2, 1, 39). According to Inst. 2, 1, 39, if anyone found treasure in his own land, the Emperor Hadrian, following
natural equity, adjudged to him the ownership of it. Hadrian established the same rule when the treasure was found
by accident in a sacred or religious place. If the treasure was found in the land of another by accident, and without
specially searching for it, Hadrian gave half to the finder, half to the owner of the land; and upon this principle, if the
treasure was found in a land belonging to the Emperor, he decided that half should belong to the latter, and half to the
finder. Consistently with this, if anyone finds treasure in a land belonging to the imperial treasury, or in a public place,
half belongs to the finder, and half to the treasury (fiscus), or the civitas. The individualist and liberal approach of Roman
law is reflected in this regime on treasure trove, as a kind of expression of private autonomy. (The original concept by
Hadrian related to treasure trove is currently amended with numerous ‘public law elements’, even in those legal systems
that are based on the Roman law tradition, since it is obvious that nowadays treasures of great archaeological and
cultural importance would not to be awarded exclusively to the finder or for the landowner. An exclusively ‘private law
approach’ seems to be unsustainable today, as the ruling of treasure trove deserves a complex approach, according to
which any treasure could be regarded as a national heritage or even a kind of ‘common heritage of mankind’.)
3 Without a detailed discussion we can refer e.g. to the Italian and provincial administrative units (civitas;
municipium; colonia; res publica; vicus; pagus) having autonomy. In this regard, we note that civitates were
considered as private individuals in Roman law (see Gai. D. 50, 16, 16: ‘civitates… privatorum loco habentur’),
having their own legal capacity (cf. Flor. D. 46, 1, 22).
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‘Autonomy’ is a modern concept (the idea of autonomy and individualism was only
developed in the legal science of the 19th century4)5 but its application to Roman law cannot
be considered as anachronistic or unhistorical. In Roman society, privacy was largely respected.
The private law legislation intruded into the private sphere relatively rarely but, if the legislator
did so, the relating legal norms often became unpopular (in this regard, we can refer e.g. to
the Augustan laws on family relations6).
As an example of Roman aversion to the law’s intrusion into the private sphere, one can
refer, inter alia, to the problem of expropriation. Expropriation did not win a wide range of
applications in classical Roman law.7 It tended to be applied instead in the age of the later
Roman Empire, which was not so ‘sensitive’ to private sphere.8
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • IVÁN SIKLÓSI
n 10
4 See Alfons Bürge, Das französische Privatrecht im 19. Jahrhundert (2nd edn, Klostermann 1995, Frankfurt am
Main) 65.
5 One can refer in this regard, for example, to the concept of legal relation (Rechtsverhältnis), which was elaborated
by Friedrich Carl von Savigny, on the basis of the Kantian concept of autonomy of will. In Savigny’s famous ‘System
des heutigen römischen Rechts’ (the theory of private law of which can be regarded as the philosophy of positive
law based on Kant’s works), the ‘great Lord’ of legal science emphasised that the essence of legal relation is the
independent reign of individual will. On this topic, see from the modern literature e.g. Alejandro Guzmán Brito,
‘Los orígenes del concepto de “Relación Jurídica”’ (2006) 28 Revista de estudios histórico-jurídicos 187–226, 187ff.
The modern concept of contract developed by the Pandectist legal science in the 19th century was also based 
on the Kantian concept of autonomy of will. As for the juridical act (legal transaction), the Pandectist concept of
juridical act matches the principle of private autonomy perfectly [cf. Werner Flume, Allgemeiner Teil des
bürgerlichen Rechts, vol 2, Das Rechtsgeschäft, (4th edn, Springer 1992, Berlin – Heidelberg – New York) 23]: juridical
act is an act regarding the manifestation of private autonomy; in other words, a juridical act is a private declaration
of will (i.e. declaration of will made by a private individual). [However, as for the autonomy of contractual will, it
already appeared e.g. in the works of Pothier, who strongly accentuated the importance of the contractual will of
the parties. Cf. e.g. Robert-Joseph Pothier, Traité des obligations, vol 1 (Debure l’aîné1764, Paris) 9. It also deserves
mentioning that the modern concept of private autonomy has its roots in canon law, too. On this problem see e.g.
Peter Landau, ‘Pacta sunt servanda. Zu den kanonistischen Grundlagen der Privatautonomie’ in Mario Ascheri
and others (eds), ‘Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane durchquert.’ Festschrift für Knut Wolfgang Nörr (Böhlau 2003,
Köln 457–474) 457ff.]
6 See the lex Iulia de maritandis ordinibus and lex Papia Poppaea, which granted various privileges to married
people and parents of children, but imposed several economic and social disadvantages on unmarried persons
and childless married persons. On this topic see e.g. Pál Csillag, The Augustan laws on family relations (Akadémiai
Kiadó 1976, Budapest); Riccardo Astolfi, La ‘lex Iulia et Papia’ (4th edn, CEDAM 1996, Padova); Dieter Nörr,
‘Planung in der Antike. Über die Ehegesetze des Augustus’ in Tiziana J. Chiusi, Wolfgang Kaiser, Hans-Dieter
Spengler (eds), Historiae iuris antiqui. Gesammelte Schriften, vol 2 (Keip, 2003, Goldbach bei Aschaffenburg)
1093ff; Hans Hermann Seiler, ‘Römische Ehe und augusteische Ehegesetzgebung’ in Hans Hermann Seiler,
Geschichte und Gegenwart im Zivilrecht. Ausgewählte Schriften (Elke Hermann ed, Heymanns 2004, Köln–Berlin–
München) 117ff.
7 Instead of expropriation, which is an institution of ‘administrative law’, purchases were concluded instead –
sometimes under political pressure – with the persons concerned.
8 By nature, Roman ownership (dominium, proprietas) had some other limits, too. It was by no means an
unrestricted right. Among the restrictions on ownership, one can also refer to the iura vicinitatis, or e.g. to the
prohibitions of alienation. Confiscation was often applied in Roman law as punishment. Moreover, the origin of
modern prohibition of abuse of rights is rooted in Roman law, too [cf. e.g. XII tab. 4, 2b (regarding the sanction
of three times sale of a filius familias); Ulp. D. 8, 5, 8, 5 (the famous case of taberna casiaria)], although – as an 
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It is beyond question that the autonomy of the will shows its clearest expression in the law
of contracts and in the law of succession. In this paper, we only want to deal with a few
problems of autonomy in the context of the law of contracts and law of succession, with
somewhat generalised references to some famous topics of Roman law in the context of
private autonomy and its restrictions.
II Some Questions of Private Autonomy in the Roman Law 
of Contracts
The question of autonomy in the context of the law of contracts is a very complex issue.
On the one hand, the law of contracts is based, in theory, on the freedom of parties, for
whom it is allowed to decide to enter or not to enter into a contractual relationship; and, if they
want to, they are permitted to decide, in what type, form, and content to conclude the
contract. The contracting parties may differ from the provisions of positive law if it is not
prohibited by a mandatory rule (ius cogens – see e.g. the provisions limiting interest rates).9
This is the essence of the modern principle of contractual freedom.
On the other hand, formalism (ritual forms) had a great importance in the archaic age of
Roman law. In this period, the essence of contract was not the individual will of the parties
but the rite. The fundament of the binding force of a contract was the form containing ritual
elements (see, for example, the institution of sponsio which was a contract of a ritual nature).
The principle ‘voluntas mater contractuum est’ [‘(contractual) will is the mother of conventions’]
is only valid in the developed Roman law, in which the contractual will of the parties (voluntas)
has great importance, and in which many contracts are formless. Nevertheless, the
‘requirement of standardisation’ (Typenzwang) remained in the whole history of Roman law,
although it had been significantly dissolved by means of (praetorian) actiones in factum
conceptae; by means of expanding the scope of actionable pacts; or by means of giving an
actio praescriptis verbis, etc. The principle of ‘pacta sunt servanda’ was not the outcome of
Roman law but this fundamental principle was developed by the scholars of canon law and,
later, by the representatives of natural law in the modern age.10 The distinction between
‘pactum’ and ‘contractus’ has an important role in Justinianic law, too: only parties to
PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND ITS RESTRICTIONS IN ROMAN LAW n
11 n
expression of private autonomy – ‘no one who does what he has a right to do is considered to commit fraud’
(‘Nullus videtur dolo facere, qui suo iure utitur’; see Gai. D. 50, 17, 55).
9 In general, it should be noted that violation of a mandatory rule may lead to invalidity in Roman law, too. The
system of causes of invalidity is a strong restriction of the private autonomy of the contracting parties. A contract
may be invalid, for instance, due to a mistake, deception, or because it is against the law or good morals, or because
the contract was made in circumvention of the law. The relevant rules are constraints of private autonomy.
10 For the roots of the pacta sunt servanda principle, see from canon law e.g. the relevant discussions of Bernardus
Papiensis, Vincentius Bellovacensis, and Hostiensis. Cf. especially the statement ‘pax servetur, pacta custodiantur’
in Liber Extra 1, 35, 1 de pactis: ‘Pacta quantumcunque nuda servanda sunt’. From the later (rationalist) natural
law literature see primarily Grotius, De iure belli ac pacis, 2, 11 De promissis.
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agreements with a so-called civilis causa (the legal basis for the contract to be sued) were
legally compellable, even in this period of Roman law.
Apart from contractual formalities, the private autonomy of the contracting parties was
respected, and it was only rarely restricted.
According to the famous sentence of Cervidius Scaevola, ‘ius civile vigilantibus scriptum
est’: civil law was written for vigilant people (Scaev. D. 42, 8, 24), i.e. it was made for those who
are diligent in protecting their own rights. According to Reinhard Zimmermann, there was
very little in the Roman law of contracts to limit this core feature of economic liberalism. The
law merely provides the framework within which the individuals may operate.11
Except in, for example, the system of causes of invalidity or the problems of novatio, this
paper only brings up the following examples of private autonomy.
a) It was permitted in Roman law to have a special agreement regarding the liability of the
parties or the risks.
As for the contractual liability, it was permitted in classical and in Justinianic Roman law
as well, to soften or to intensify the liability of the parties (compared to the provisions of
positive law). For example, on the one hand, liability only for dolus (‘deceit’ or ‘fraud’) instead
of liability for culpa (‘fault’ or ‘negligence’), or a responsibility for culpa instead of custodia-
liability was allowed to be specified, and, on the other hand, the establishment of a more
rigorous culpa- or an objective custodia-liability (‘safekeeping’) instead of dolus- or culpa-
liability was also permitted. Nevertheless, the contractual freedom of the parties had its limits.
The liability for dolus – since dolus is contrary to the objective principle of bona fides – was
not allowed to be excluded; such an agreement was null and void in Roman law,12 too. 
It should generally be noted that bona fides (good faith and fair dealing) can itself be considered
as a limit of contractual autonomy,13 too.14
As for the allocation of risks, it was based decisively on the private autonomy of the
parties. An agreement regarding the risks can have a special importance, for example in
a contract of sale. According to the principle ‘periculum est emptoris’, the purchaser, when
the sale has been completed, must assume the risk.15 This rule was only concerned, however,
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • IVÁN SIKLÓSI
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11 Reinhard Zimmermann, The law of obligations. Roman foundations of the civilian tradition (3rd edn, Oxford
University Press 1996, Oxford) 258.
12 Cf. Paul. D. 13, 6, 17 pr. regarding commodatum (loan for use); Ulp. D. 16, 3, 1, 7 regarding depositum (deposit);
Ulp. D. 50, 17, 23 regarding, in general, the bonae fidei iudicia; see, in addition, Paul. D. 2, 14, 27, 3.
13 Cf. Giovanni Meruzzi, L’exceptio doli dal diritto civile al diritto commerciale (CEDAM 2005, Padova), 203ff (‘come
limite all’autonomia contrattuale’).
14 On the problems of bona fides see from the Hungarian literature the works of András Földi, e.g.: András Földi, 
A jóhiszeműség és tisztesség elve [(Principle of good faith and fair dealing) ELTE ÁJK 2001, Budapest].
15 Cf. Paul. D. 18, 6, 8 pr.: ‘[…] perfecta emptione periculum ad emptorem respiciet.’ On the principle ‘periculum est
emptoris’ see e.g. Wolfgang Ernst, ‘Periculum est emptoris’ (1982) 99 (1) Zeitschrift der Savigny-Stiftung für
Rechtsgeschichte, Romanistische Abteilung 216–248, 216ff; Martin Bauer, ‘Periculum emptoris.’ Eine dogmenge -
schichtliche Untersuchung zur Gefahrtragung beim Kauf (Duncker & Humblot 1998, Berlin); Éva Jakab,
Risiko management beim Weinkauf (C. H. Beck 2009, München).
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with ‘acts of God’ (vis maior, i.e. events which human weakness cannot prevent16), and the
allocation of other contract-specific risks was the object of the agreement of the parties. Other
examples of the special clauses concerning the allocation of risks can be mentioned from the
sphere of locatio conductio [cf. e.g. Flor. D. 19, 22, 36 on the topic of locatio conductio operis
(contract of enterprise)].
b) A good example of the restriction of contractual autonomy is the rule of laesio enormis
in postclassical Roman law.
According to classical law, the determination of the purchase price was fully an object of
the parties’ agreement. In this regard, the ‘economic liberalism’ and private autonomy were
fully respected. Taking advantage of one another was ‘naturally’ permitted for the contracting
parties (cf. Ulp. D. 4, 4, 16, 4: ‘…in pretio emptionis et venditionis naturaliter licere
contrahentibus se circumvenire.’). In a transaction of purchase and sale it is naturally conceded
that the parties can either purchase or sell something for more or for less, and hence mutually
circumvent one another (cf. Paul. D. 19, 2, 22, 3). The law of contracts primarily provides
a framework within which individuals may operate, and it does not usually have a protective
function. A notable exception was the Roman legislation against usury, but it is out of the
topic of the contract of sale. No attempts were made in classical Roman law to interfere with
the freedom of the parties to a contract of sale to fix the price.17
The rescission of the sale – due to the lack of equivalence – was originally and even later
excluded. However, in case of laesio enormis,18 which was a product of the economic crisis
in the end of the 3rd century, the freedom to determine the purchase price was already
restricted, but only in the sale of real estate. By means of the disputed legal institution of laesio
enormis, the legislator restricted the private autonomy of the parties with regard to the sale
of real estate, which could be rescinded by the seller if he did not receive even half of the real
value of the estate.19 The legal construction of laesio enormis (which rule shows an entirely
PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND ITS RESTRICTIONS IN ROMAN LAW n
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16 See Gai. D. 44, 7, 1, 4. Furthermore, see Gai. D. 13, 6, 18 pr.; Ulp. D. 19, 2, 15, 2; C. 4, 65, 28. As for the literature
on vis maior see, for example, Adolf Exner, Der Begriff der höheren Gewalt (‘vis maior’) im römischen und heutigen
Verkehrsrecht (Hölder 1883, Wien); Alfredo De Medio, ‘Caso fortuito e forza maggiore in diritto romano’ (1908)
20 Bullettino dell’Istituto di Diritto Romano ‘Vittorio Scialoja’ 157–209, 157ff; Theo Mayer-Maly, ‘Höhere Gewalt:
Falltypen und Begriffsbildung’ in Hermann Baltl (ed), Festschrift für A. Steinwenter (Hermann Böhlaus Nachfolger
1958, Graz–Köln, 58–77) 58ff; Wolfgang Ernst, ‘Wandlungen des “vis maiorˮ-Begriffes in der Entwicklung der
römischen Rechtswissenschaft’ (1994) 22 Index. Studi camerti di studi romanistici 293–321, 293ff; Felix Wubbe,
‘Vi tempestatis’ in Jean-François Gerkens (ed), Mélanges F. Sturm, vol 1 (Editions juridiques de l’Université de
Liège 1999, Liège, 579–593) 579ff.
17 See Zimmermann (n 11) 258.
18 See C. 4, 44, 2 and 8.
19 From the virtually boundless literature of laesio enormis, see e.g. René Dekkers, La lésion énorme (Librairie du
Recueil Sirey 1937, Paris); Boudewijn Sirks, ‘La “laesio enormis” en droit romain et byzantin’ (1985) 53 Tijdschrift
voor rechtsgeschiedenis 291–307, 291ff; Martin Pennitz, ‘Zur Anfechtung wegen “laesio enormisˮ im römischen
Recht’ in Martin J. Schermaier, J. Michael Rainer und Laurens C. Winkel (eds), Iurisprudentia universalis. Festschrift
für Theo Mayer-Maly (Böhlau 2002, Köln–Weimar–Wien, 575–589) 575ff; Matthias Armgardt, ‘Zur Dogmen ge -
schichte der „laesio enormis’ – eine historische und rechtsvergleichende Betrachtung’ in Karl Riesenhuber, Ioannis
K. Karakostas (eds), Inhaltskontrolle im nationalen und Europäischen Privatrecht (De Gruyter 2009, Berlin, 3–18) 
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different approach compared to classical law) can be regarded, in our opinion,20 as one of the
cases of annulment according to ius civile in Roman law.
III Private Autonomy in the Roman Law of Succession
Private autonomy is of great importance, by nature, in the law of succession, too.
Testamentary freedom is undoubtedly one of the most important expressions of private
autonomy. The testator’s freedom to make a last will was already provided by the Twelve
Tables (cf. XII tab. 5, 321). However, in Roman law, testamentary freedom was restricted from
several aspects. Two examples are highlighted as follows.
a) The testator’s freedom was significantly restricted through the statutes on the limits of
legacies. Such were the lex Furia testamentaria, which fixed the maximum amount of a legacy
at one thousand assēs (this was the earliest statute setting limits for legacies22); the lex Voconia,
according to which nobody could receive by legacy more than the heir;23 and the lex Falcidia,
which provided that legacies should not exceed three quarters of the testator’s estate.24 These
laws can be considered as sharp restrictions of testamentary freedom and, therefore, can be
regarded as relatively rare signs of Roman law interventions into the private sphere.
b) Another significant limitation of testamentary freedom was the regulation considering
debita portio, from the classical era of Roman law. According to this, the descendants, or, in
their absence, the ascendants, or, in their absence, the siblings of the testator shall have at
least one fourth of the legitimate portion of inheritance (cf. Ulp. D. 5, 2, 1; Inst. 2, 18, 1). In
modern jurisdictions, reserved portion can be regarded as the most significant limit of
testamentary freedom. In civil law jurisdictions, reserved portion is an essential part of the
inheritance law, contrary to modern English law, in which all property may be disposed of by
n ELTE LAW JOURNAL • IVÁN SIKLÓSI
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3ff; Daniil Tuzov, ‘La “rescissio” della compravendita nel diritto romano tardoclassico e postclassico’ in Luigi
Garofalo (ed) ‘Actio in rem’ e ‘actio in personam’. In ricordo di Mario Talamanca (CEDAM 2011, Padova, 835–891)
835ff; Aleksander Grebieniow, ‘La “laesio enormis” e la stabilità contrattuale’ (2014) 61 Revue internationale des
droits de l’Antiquité 195–216, 195ff; Paola Lambrini, ‘Ipotesi in tema di rescissione per “lesione enorme”’ in
Zuzanna Benincasa, Jakub Urbanik (eds) Mater familias. Scritti romanistici per Maria Zabłocka (2016, Warszawa,
453–464) 453ff. – From Diocletian’s time, the other famous example of the direct intervention into the price was
the edictum de pretiis rerum venalium (301) [cf. Siegfried Lauffer (ed), Diokletians Preisedikt (De Gruyter 1971,
Berlin)].
20 See Iván Siklósi, A nemlétező, érvénytelen és hatálytalan jogügyletek elméleti és dogmatikai kérdései a római jogban
és a modern jogokban [(Theoretical and dogmatic questions of the inexistence, invalidity, and ineffectiveness of
juridical acts in Roman law and in modern legal systems), ELTE Eötvös Kiadó 2014, Budapest] 234ff.
21 XII tab. 5, 3 (of which several versions are known, cf. Cic. De invent. 2, 50, 148; Pomp. D. 50, 16, 120; Paul. D. 50,
16, 53 pr.) provides the opportunity to bequeath [by will (probably by mancipatio familiae – testamentum per aes
et libram)] the property (familia pecuniaque) of a Roman citizen sui iuris.
22 Cf. Gai. 2, 225; L. s. reg. 1, 2.
23 Cf. Gai. 2, 226.
24 Cf. e.g. Gai. 2, 227.
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will, and in which a reasonable part or a reserved portion is currently not institutionalised (as
opposed to early English Common law in which a writ de rationabili parte bonorum was
available for the wife and the children of the deceased).
When it comes to the private autonomy in the law of succession, it is particularly
important to refer to the Roman principle of favor testamenti, too. From the classical period
of Roman law, this principle became a widely applied rule.25 According to favor testamenti,
in conditions mentioned in wills, the intention, rather than the words of the testator, should
be considered. (In connection with the principle of favor testamenti, the partial invalidity e.g.
had of greater importance in the Roman law of succession,26 than that in the law of contracts.)
PRIVATE AUTONOMY AND ITS RESTRICTIONS IN ROMAN LAW n
15 n
25 Cf., in general, Pap. D. 35, 1, 101 pr.; Paul. D. 50, 17, 12; Marc. D. 34, 5, 24.
26 Cf. e.g. Pap. D. 5, 2, 15, 2; Pap. D. 5, 2, 28; Paul. D. 5, 2, 19; Paul. D. 28, 5, 20, 2; Ulp. D. 5, 2, 24; Marci. D. 28, 7, 14;
Inst. 2, 14, 10.
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